Episode 9: Wilson, Farook, and Williams

[00:00:05.870] [SPEAKER_01] North Carolina's Castle Doctrine Statute, General Statute 14-51.2, provides that it is presumptively reasonable for the lawful occupant of a home, motor vehicle, or workplace to respond to an intruder with deadly force. The Court of Appeals has now held that the protection of that statute extends to a person who is outside of his motor vehicle at the time he used deadly force against an intruder. We'll be discussing that case, Stateview Williams, today. I'm Joseph Hyde with the University of North Carolina School of Government. And I'm Jonathan Holbrook with the North Carolina Conference of District Attorneys. And this is Turning States, a podcast for North Carolina prosecutors and others interested in the criminal justice system in North Carolina.
[00:00:50.740] [SPEAKER_00] Joe, I do want to talk about that Castle Doctrine case, but first we've got a case on for today about an indictment for kidnapping. So tell us a little bit about State v. Wilson.
[00:00:59.685] [SPEAKER_01] State v. Wilson. This is a Court of Appeals decision decided at the end of December, December 31st, 2024. The facts in this case were that the defendant was being investigated by the Beaufort County Sheriff's Office for sexual misconduct against three females. Two of them were minors. One of the victims was defendant's step-granddaughter, whom the Court of Appeals called Claire. As to Claire, defendant was charged with five counts of indecent liberties, four counts of sexual servitude of a child, two counts of sex offense by a person in a parental role, and one count each of first-degree statutory sex offense with a child, and relevant to this case, first-degree kidnapping for the alleged purpose of sexual servitude. As to the kidnapping charge, the evidence at trial showed that in 2015, defendant confined Claire in a bathroom until she complied with his demand to take pictures of her breasts with his cell phone. The trial court instructed the jury on first-degree kidnapping and the lesser-included offense of secondary kidnapping based on a theory of involuntary servitude, not sexual servitude, as alleged in the indictment. The defendant was convicted of secondary kidnapping, five counts of indecent liberties. The defendant was found not guilty of sexual servitude for dates overlapping with the kidnapping charge. That ends up being relevant to the Court of Appeals' analysis of prejudice here. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court plainly erred by instructing the jury on a theory that was not alleged in the indictment. Again, the kidnapping indictment alleged the purpose of the kidnapping was sexual servitude. The trial court instructed the jury on involuntary servitude, which is a different statutory offense specifically referenced in the kidnapping statute. Under General Statute 14-39, a person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully confines, restrains, or removes another person if such confinement, restraint, or removal is for the purpose of, among other things, either holding the other person in involuntary servitude or subjecting or maintaining the other person for sexual servitude. In this case, the state actually conceded error on appeal, namely that the trial court had instructed the jury on a theory not alleged in the indictment, but they argued that the error was not so prejudicial as to amount to plain error. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held the trial court erred by instructing the jury as to a theory not alleged in the indictment. It noted that involuntary servitude and sexual servitude are two different crimes, both defined by statutes specifically referenced in the kidnapping statute. The Court of Appeals specifically observed that the verdict of guilty as to the charges of sexual servitude indicated that the jury here considered the involuntary servitude to be different from sexual servitude. So it was actually a result of having those additional charges. The Court of Appeals could say, look, the jury acquitted the defendant of these other charges of sexual servitude. So the only way they could have convicted him of kidnapping was based on this erroneous instruction of involuntary servitude. The Court of Appeals recited a Supreme Court precedent for the proposition that it is error generally prejudicial for the trial court to permit a jury to convict on a theory not supported by the indictment.
[00:03:59.652] [SPEAKER_00] So, Joe, that's sort of my question. You know, you said the state actually conceded error here, and we've got precedent saying that it is error for the trial judge to instruct the jury on a theory not alleged, and it sounds like that's exactly what happened here. So what's surprising or what's different about the outcome for this case?
[00:04:14.425] [SPEAKER_01] What's a little surprising is there's no mention or discussion here of state fee singleton. Singleton was the case that the North Carolina Supreme Court decided back in 2024. And remember, Singleton moved North Carolina away from that common law rule that says a facial defect in an indictment deprives the trial court of jurisdiction. Singleton seemed to be sort of this massive change for indictment law moving forward, saying we're no longer going to be tied to these old technicalities about an indictment. The question I had about this case was, it seems that this indictment perhaps would have been sufficient under Singleton even without having alleged this theory of sexual servitude. So what difference does it make that the trial court instructed the jury on a different theory? I think one possible answer to that question is Singleton is still concerned with the notice that an indictment provides to a defendant. And the defendant here at least has a plausible argument where if the indictment put him on notice of one particular theory of kidnapping, then it was error for the trial court to instruct on another, that the state would not be permitted sort of at the end of the trial to pull a switcheroo and try to get him on a theory of kidnapping that was not alleged in the original indictment.
[00:05:20.067] [SPEAKER_00] So along those same lines, could the prosecutor have simply moved to amend and change the basis under Singleton, or would we still have the same problem about a substantial alteration?
[00:05:30.528] [SPEAKER_01] Right now, we don't have a clear answer to that question from the case law. Singleton kind of changed the landscape for those indictments that failed to allege a particular element, but it didn't go so far as to say what the consequences would be of trying to amend that indictment later. I think based on what we've got, We've got to think that there would have been a problem there with notice, because like I said, Singleton is still concerned with the statutory requirements and that constitutional requirement that a defendant be put on notice of what the charges are. I think if the state here had tried to go back and change the indictment after the presentation of evidence, there would have been this fight with the defendant over whether he had received adequate notice whatsoever. by those allegations.
[00:06:09.456] [SPEAKER_00] And then finally, Joe, what do you make of this discussion about whether the sort of the emotional and mental trauma that the victim suffered may have been serious injury? We didn't seem to get very far with that.
[00:06:18.865] [SPEAKER_01] Yeah, there's a discussion in the Court of Appeals opinion here because this was another place where the trial court instructed on a theory not alleged. The original first degree kidnapping indictment alleged that the victim had been sexually assaulted. There was a discussion at trial where the trial court said there's just this locking her in the bathroom doesn't really count as a sexual assault. So, the state says, okay, fine, instead of sexual assault, why don't you instruct the jury on first-degree kidnapping on a theory of inflicting serious injury? That's ultimately what the trial court did. The Court of Appeals doesn't really need to probe that problem too much because the jury convicted the defendant of secondary kidnapping. In other words, they found there was neither a sexual assault nor a serious injury. So they don't really go into that problem too much here. But I think had this defendant been convicted of first-degree kidnapping, you would have the same problem that you have with regard to the purpose alleged, that this was a theory that was presented to the jury that had not been in the original indictment.
[00:07:11.692] [SPEAKER_00] So then what's our takeaway for prosecutors on these kinds of cases?
[00:07:14.637] [SPEAKER_01] The takeaway for prosecutors here is you got to check your indictment even after singleton. Singleton may have removed some of those technical requirements, but during the charge conference, it's a good idea to go back and make sure that the instruction that's going to be given to the jury conforms with the allegations in the indictment. Like you said, this variance problem about instructing on a theory that's not alleged at least if Wilson is any indication seems to have survived the upheaval and indictment law that Singleton created. So given that that's still a possibility, it would be a good idea moving forward for prosecutors to make sure that the instructions given to the jury are consistent with the theory of the crime alleged in the indictment.
[00:07:53.257] [SPEAKER_00] And if we've gotten on the eve of trial and we realize perhaps the evidence that's going to come out at trial isn't exactly the way we indicted it, that maybe this is a sort of a warning shot that we want to take a step back and supersede if we need to make that kind of change prior to trial.
[00:08:05.673] [SPEAKER_01] Absolutely. Before the jury has been impaneled and sworn, you're not going to have as much of a problem going back and trying to tinker with the indictment. You can do a superseding indictment. I think an amendment, if you're going to go that route, would be safer to do at the stage before you get into the process of trial.
[00:08:20.593] [SPEAKER_00] And I mean, again, we may run into that issue of if it's a substantial alteration, maybe not allowed as an amendment, but certainly a superseding would be a fail-safe way to go if we know it ahead of time.
[00:08:29.855] [SPEAKER_01] Or dismiss and recharge. I mean, prior to the jury being impaneled, that's always a possibility.
[00:08:35.326] [SPEAKER_00] I want to make sure we save time to get into this sort of interesting State v. Williams case, but one other that we want to discuss before we do that is a case called State v. Farouk. This is one that we got from the Court of Appeals on December 31st of 2024, and this is a case with sort of a long history. It comes out of Rowan County. It actually starts all the way back on June 17th of 2012, when the defendant was driving his car in Rowan County, crossed over the center line, and collided with a motorcycle that was driven by Tommy Jones and Suzette Jones as a passenger. Both of them were killed as a result of that collision. There was a witness who saw the defendant get out of his car, after the collision, look at the two bodies, get back in his car, and then basically start walking away from the scene of the crash. The witness tried to follow him, but ultimately was not able to do that. Law enforcement, of course, was called and responded to the scene. They actually did stop relatively shortly after there, after the collision, a person near the scene, but that person provided the name Khalil Farouk, and they were, based on the vehicle, looking for a person at that time they believed to be named Donald Miller, did not realize these two people were one and the same, and so he was released at that time, but later turned himself in about two days later. The defendant was initially charged with felony hit and run resulting in death, DWI, and resisting an officer, and was then charged with two additional charges of felony death by vehicle and placed in jail on the day of his arrest back in June of 2012. A substantial period of time passes before his case finally comes to trial, and we're going to talk about what happened in that intervening period, but additional charges were sought. He was also charged with second-degree murder prior to going to trial, and the case finally did come on for trial on October 8th of 2018, and he was then convicted of felony failure to remain at the scene of the crash. and two counts of second-degree murder. He then subsequently entered a guilty plea to the violent habitual felon charge, and judgments were entered on all of that. This case was initially appealed based on the denial of his speedy trial motion. A hearing was held on that motion prior to the case actually being called for trial, and the trial judge denied the motion. However, some of the evidence that was presented by the state included testimony from one of his prior attorneys in the case who testified about his thought process and that, yes, it had essentially been a strategic decision on his part that he wanted to see that case delayed under this idea that things usually don't get better for the state as time passes and witness memories get a little bit fuzzier. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was error to allow that testimony. The state did it because the defendant had essentially filed a pro se ineffective assistance of counsel motion, presumably waiving any privilege between attorney and client on that issue. The Court of Appeals said in the prior opinion in this case, they said no, that pro se filing was essentially a legal nullity, and so there was no ineffective assistance of counsel, meaning there was no waiver, meaning it was error to let that testimony come in at the hearing, and therefore they would have granted the speedy trial motion, dismissed the case, vacated the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed on that and said no, the right remedy would be to send this back down for a second hearing on the speedy trial motion, take other evidence from the parties without allowing that improper testimony from his prior counsel. So that happened in October of 2022, that secondary hearing. The trial court again denied the speedy trial motion based on what was presented at the hearing. That's the first part of what's being reviewed in this decision, that second hearing. So This opinion walks through those four Barker v. Wingo factors that we have to look at to decide whether the defendant did or did not prevail on his speedy trial claim. Of course, the first factor, which is also the trigger for a speedy trial claim, is the length of the delay. And yes, there is a significant length here in this case. Cases have generally said after a year or so, we've reached a presumptive point that probably would trigger this four-step inquiry. And so obviously, we're beyond that. But they do acknowledge, yes, there's a substantial delay here. This is happening in 2012 before we're finally getting to the trial some six years later in 2018. But as the court points out, this is just factor one. It doesn't end the inquiry and the other three factors have to be examined to decide in their words if this factor even weighing in favor of the defendant is outweighed by the remaining factors so that's what they then look through the second factor is okay there was a delay what is the reason for the delay you know was it some was it willful on the part of the state was it negligent was it caused by the defendant they have to go through and analyze those factors And they do that in this case, and they look at the evidence that was presented at that hearing at the trial court level, which primarily dealt with things like the simple backlog of cases Rowan County was dealing with. And there was evidence presented on that at the hearing that was held by the trial court showing that, for example, back in this 2009, 2010, up through 2010 or 11, that there were some 3,000 cases pending in Rowan County as a backlog. And there was evidence presented about the Rowan County's staffing level and their caseloads, for example. A work study showing that they only really had 80% of the prosecutors that they needed to do the work they needed to do. In Rowan County during this time, for example, most Superior Court ADAs had an average of 601 cases as their caseload compared to other prosecutors around the state who are certainly not getting a free ride either, but only have a caseload averaging about 357 cases. So anyway, the court looks at factors like that. There were other reasons for the delay. You know, there was a backlog at the crime lab trying to get these DNA results turned in. So the court goes through analyzing all those factors and ultimately concludes under this prong number two, that yes, there were delays that were happening here. They were not negligent or willful, but they are to a large extent attributable to the state in some way. And so consistent with some of the case precedent we've had on this, they ultimately decide these reasons for the delay conclude they should have weighed this factor, they say, slightly in the favor of the defendant. So, you know, yes, we've got a long delay, now there's reasons for the delay, they weigh slightly in the defendant's favor. We then move to factor number three, which is whether the defendant did or did not timely assert his right to a speedy trial. It's significant in this case that this motion for speedy trial that was heard before the actual trial in 2018 was only filed just a couple of weeks before the trial happened, even though this case had been pending for some six years. So they look at that, and it was argued at the trial level on the remand hearing that this should weigh heavily against the defendant. Some 99.9% of the delay has happened before you're ever formally asserting your right to a speedy trial. The Court of Appeals here looks at it a little bit differently. They acknowledge, yes, the formal demand was not made until essentially this last minute before the trial happens, but they note there were some other, what they call informal demands that were being- He had sent a bunch of letters to the federal district court or something like that? There were some other, exactly. You know, there were some federal filings that had been made, some letters to the judge. These are not, again, not formal demands, but things they acknowledge as sort of informal ways of... making it known in their eyes that he wanted something done with his case. Wait a minute, wait a minute, wait a minute. These are pro se
[00:16:04.076] [SPEAKER_01] letters, right? These are pro se requests. Right. And this is the same thing that the Court of Appeals in the last time said doesn't count.
[00:16:09.943] [SPEAKER_00] They did say that in the ineffective assistance of counsel format. You're exactly right. They said that pro se motion was not enough to really be deemed a proper ineffective assistance of counsel claim to trigger the waiver of attorney-client privilege. But here, they are saying these informal motions do, to some extent, count as him asserting or making known. The way they describe it is this, Joe. They say, as the defendant made multiple informal assertions regarding his speedy trial rights, and these informal assertions were served on the state, we conclude his failure to submit a formal demand for speedy trial until September of 2018 should not weigh against him. But since defendant's formal assertion was not made until shortly before the trial date, we give this factor neutral weight instead of being weighed against the defendant. So that's our first three factors. The final one would be prejudice. And if you're kind of keeping score as we go, we do have a Pretty lengthy delay under factor one. It's some six years from offense until trial. Under factor two, reason for the delay, they're saying this is understandable, but still weighs somewhat against the state. And now under factor three, they're saying that this is essentially neutral instead of being weighed against the defendant. So now our final one would be factor four. And under Barker v. Wingo, the final factor is understanding. any prejudice to the defendant. Did it actually hurt his ability to defend his case, to locate witnesses, something along those lines, based on how long it took to get there. And under factor four, the court pretty clearly confirms that the answer to that is No. I mean, there was nothing presented at the remand hearing about, had I not been held in jail for all this time, I would have been able to locate this other witness. I would have had this exculpatory evidence. There's just no showing of that made in any way. One of the more interesting arguments that was made by the defense was, hey, remember, I was originally only charged with these things, this felony death by motor vehicle and resisting an officer. And it's only much later in the process, this case was, because of the backlog and the overload on the prosecutors, this case was given to the Conference of District Attorneys to prosecute. So my colleague, Sarah Garner, was the one who actually did the trial on this back in 2018. And she was the one who filed the indictments for second degree murder above and beyond, along with habitual felon and violent habitual felon. And so the argument was, had this been resolved sooner, maybe I never would have faced those higher level indictments. And the court rejects that argument. You know, they cite some testimony from the hearing that this was, these charges were always being contemplated by the state. People knew these were a possibility. It's sometimes part of plea negotiations that, you know, if you're willing to plead to this or that, maybe we don't have to file these additional charges like a understood and essentially in play. They weren't triggered or caused simply by the delay. And so ultimately, under this fourth factor, they find that there is no prejudice, including comparing it under the way it was characterized in the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in this Farouk case, the prior one, where they talked about some kind of inherit prejudice in a delay itself, just some presumptive prejudice by the fact that it took some number of years. But even viewed in that light and then squaring that with other precedent we've had like state versus farmer, they ultimately find essentially no prejudice in the case. And so wrapping it up under that fourth prong, they say we see no reason to depart from farmer and likewise conclude the prejudice prong weighs against the defendant as the state presented substantial evidence as to the backlog in the case, and we are unconvinced the defendant was prejudiced because the state filed additional charges against him. So they confirm the trial court's denial of his speedy trial motion. That, however, is not the end of the case because this was initially just settled on the speedy trial issue. Remember, it was reversed for that initially and then reversed on that by the Supreme Court and sent back for the hearing that we're discussing in this opinion. Other issues raised in the original appeal had not yet been settled, one of those being an alleged Harbison error, because at the original trial back in 2018, the defendant's attorney in closing admitted or asked the jury to find that the defendant was guilty of misdemeanor death by motor vehicle rather than finding him guilty of second degree murder. And so the defendant is arguing that that constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. And they're saying that because the defendant stipulated to a number of factors prior to trial. These are Yeah,
[00:20:49.564] [SPEAKER_01] Jonathan, just remind us, Harbison is the one that says where counsel stipulates or admits to a defendant's guilt without the defendant's overt consent in effective assistance per se.
[00:20:57.920] [SPEAKER_00] Exactly, exactly. And he's contending that that's what's going on here. But
[00:21:01.026] [SPEAKER_01] here there was some indication that he had made some stipulations, right? That he had made admissions with his counsel's consent. I mean, counsel had made admissions with defendant's consent.
[00:21:09.300] [SPEAKER_00] Exactly. There's a harvest and inquiry that happens regarding these stipulations, and there are actually written signed stipulations that were entered into the record. And so the defendant, shortly before the trial happens, October 8th of 2018, stipulates that at the time of the crash on Sunday, June 17th on Airport Road, Defendant was the driver and operator of the 96 Saturn four-door sedan that was involved in the crash. That at the time of the crash, defendant knew his license was in a state of revocation for an implied consent offense, driving while impaired. The defendant does stipulate that all these prior convictions listed charging with being an habitual felon are in fact his prior convictions and stipulates that both of the prior convictions listed in this other file number charging with being a violent habitual felon are in fact his prior convictions.
[00:21:53.934] [SPEAKER_01] So how does he get any traction with a Harbison claim if the trial court conducted a Harbison inquiry?
[00:21:58.904] [SPEAKER_00] So what the Court of Appeals is saying in the final part of this opinion is, yes, he stipulated to these various factors, which the state would contend are essentially elements of misdemeanor death by motor vehicle, but the Court of Appeals is saying it's not clear to us that by stipulating to the elements that he is essentially stipulating or acknowledging his outright guilt to the offense that is comprised of those elements. They say, even assuming defendant knowingly consented to each element of the offense during the trial court's harvest and inquiry, nothing in our record indicates defendant knew the consequences of admitting these elements or that admitting these facts and elements would amount to admitting guilt to the entire offense. And so on that issue, the Court of Appeals has remanded it back for another fact-finding hearing by the trial court to settle this issue of did the defendant know or understand that he was, by admitting to the elements, admitting to the offense? And presumably as well, you know, whether that constitutes the harvest and error as they've alleged. That would be the outcome of the Court of Appeals case to send it back for this additional hearing. However, this has been stayed and the Attorney General's Office is filing a petition for discretionary review to ask the Supreme Court to take a look at that. What's the
[00:23:19.442] [SPEAKER_01] takeaway for prosecutors here? I mean, faced with this Harbison scenario, what more can you do than ask the trial court to conduct a Harbison inquiry? Didn't the prosecutor do everything he or she should have done in this case?
[00:23:30.275] [SPEAKER_00] The only additional question perhaps that could be asked would, you know, if the point of the harvest and admissions is that the defendant is intending to admit to offense Y when charged with offense X, if that's where we're going, and we all know that's where we're going, you know, maybe there wouldn't be this question about it if that was just made crystal clear on the record, rather than just doing the elements, we get to the following. But, you know, Joe, I think there's Questions here about the scope of the stipulations,
[00:23:56.961] [SPEAKER_01] the extent of the admissions. I mean, whether Harbison really requires the defendant not only to admit, but also recognize the full consequences of the behavior or something like that.
[00:24:05.432] [SPEAKER_00] That's right. So at this point, we'll just have to wait and see what does or does not happen with the petition for discretionary review of the Supreme Court. Depending on how that goes or if that goes forward, then we'll see what happens at the follow-up hearing on this ineffective assistance of counsel issue. So stay tuned. Probably more to be said about this one. And finally, Joe, that brings us to our last case, State v. Williams. Yeah, Williams is
[00:24:25.915] [SPEAKER_01] that Castle Doctrine case that I previewed at the very beginning. State v. Williams is a case back in August of 2020. Defendant and a woman by the name of Miracle Lewis were sitting in defendant's car in front of her home talking. They had apparently just gone on a date when her ex-boyfriend, a guy named Martin Penny, approached the car. Penny apparently opened the passenger side door. He and defendant had some kind of verbal altercation. The evidence was that Penny leaned in and began punching the defendant. Defendant had some trouble getting out of the car, wrestling with a handle, something like this. He finally makes it out of the vehicle. Penny came around the front of the car, met defendant in the street, and they continued their altercation. Penny was continuing his attack on defendant. Defendant somehow acquired a gun. It's not clear whether it was his firearm or Penny's firearm. In any event, he shot Penny twice, killing him. Defendant then drove away from the scene. The defendant was charged with murder and with possession of a firearm by a felon. At trial, defendant requested an instruction under the Castle Doctrine Statute, General Statute 14-51.2. The trial court denied the request, reasoning that that statute applies only to an occupant of the premises, and here the evidence showed there were no occupants of the vehicle at the time of the shooting. The trial court instructed the jury on first-degree murder, second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, also instructed the jury on self-defense and possession of a firearm by a felon. I want to emphasize that point. He got a self-defense instruction. What he did not get, what the trial court refused, was that additional protection provided by the Castle Doctrine and Statute 14-51.2. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred in two ways. One, by failing to instruct on the Castle Doctrine, and secondly, by instructing the jury on excessive force. Because the Court of Appeals was able to resolve the issue on the first issue, they didn't reach that question about excessive force. Remember, under General Statute 14-51.2, the lawful occupant of a home, motor vehicle, or workplace is presumed to have a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm when using deadly force if one, an intruder was unlawfully and forcefully entering, and two, the defendant knew it or had reasonable grounds to know it. The Court of Appeals in this case said that for the defendant to be entitled to a castle doctrine instruction, the evidence must have shown that defendant was an occupant of the vehicle, and secondly, that Penny was unlawfully and forcefully entering the car and that the defendant knew it. The Court of Appeals does this extensive statutory interpretation of the term occupant. Ultimately, they found the term was ambiguous, but concluded based on what they said, the language, the object, and spirit of the Castle Doctrine statute, that the lawful occupant need not remain within the premises in order to invoke the statute's protection. Applying that interpretation, the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court erred in finding that the defendant was not an occupant of the vehicle at the relevant time. Further, the evidence showed that Penny had unlawfully and forcefully entered the vehicle and the defendant knew it, and therefore defendant was entitled to a Castle Doctrine instruction. Now, the state made this argument on appeal that Penny had exited and discontinued all efforts to enter, and under the Castle Doctrine, that is an exception, a way to get out of this presumption of a reasonable fear. The Court of Appeals said that that issue, whether the evidence showed that Penny had exited and discontinued all efforts to enter, was a question for the jury and that it was not going to consider that issue on appeal. Ultimately, it found that the error was prejudicial and the defendant was entitled to a new trial. There was a concurrence here. Judge Stroud concurred in the result only. She rejected the majority's long, extensive statutory construction of the word occupant. She said the statute was straightforward and unambiguous. Though defendant was outside the vehicle, he was still protected as a lawful occupant because he was forced out by Penny's invasion and Penny had not abandoned his attack. There's some language in the majority opinion that echoes this concern where they say under the specific facts of this case, where the intruder was actually continuing an attack that had occurred within the premises and the defendant was forced out of the premises as a result of that attack, he didn't abandon the protection of the statute merely by stepping outside of the premises.
[00:28:33.214] [SPEAKER_00] So, Joe, this is what I'm trying to wrap my head around and what I was a little bit concerned about when I read this case. You mentioned this statutory interpretation discussion about what does it mean to say there's an occupant? And they go through those kind of two different ways we could look at it. One might be you're an occupant, as they say, if you're in actual physical control of the vehicle. But then they talk about you could also be an occupant if you essentially have control. control over the location, you know, where the opportunity and ability to access and enter and therefore control the vehicle. And that seems to be the one they're going with, right? I mean, that that's a way we're going to look at an occupant. And I just, I struggle with that a little bit because they also say in here, you know, a home has a hey, all I really need to have is opportunity and ability to access and enter, then I guess my question is, if I'm just standing next to my car and I haven't actually been inside of it since yesterday, but I've got the key with me, if I get attacked outside my car, Am I now getting this statutory presumption because I have the ability to control the vehicle even though I'm not within it at the time?
[00:29:40.407] [SPEAKER_01] I think we don't have a lot of cases yet kind of examining that question, but I think the answer to that question is no. I blogged recently on the criminal law blog about this case and comparing it to a case that we discussed recently called Carwile. Remember, Carwile was the one where there was an intruder in the defendant's home, and then the defendant chased the intruder outside of the home, across the yard, onto an adjacent lot, and there beat him to death with a wrench. And the Court of Appeals had no problem saying in that scenario, right, where you have exited the home and actually pursued an intruder that far, you do not get the protection of the Castle Doctrine. What I think this case Williams introduces is that there's a temporal aspect as well as a spatial aspect to this Castle Doctrine protection. Here, the majority in the dissent focused on the fact that the defendant was forced out of the vehicle by this intruder's attack. It was immediately after that attack and while that attack was ongoing outside of the car that the defendant used deadly force. So in your scenario where a whole day has passed, the fact that you just happen to be still standing next to your car, I don't think you get that protection. It has to be kind of an ongoing transaction where the intruder has continued the attack and the defendant is still under threat of that attack when he uses that deadly force.
[00:30:51.184] [SPEAKER_00] Because again, as you say, they're tying it to these specific facts where when it started, he was inside the car. It's just that it kept going and spilled out of the car. And that's different. It's not like there's this circle of protection around your car like the curtilage of a home.
[00:31:06.321] [SPEAKER_01] Right, right. And they look specifically to that statutory language that says this applies to the lawful occupant of a home and pertains also to one who may have been taken out of the premises, forced out of the car, forced out of the house by the intrusion or the invasion of this other person. So in this scenario, right, where the defendant exited the premises only as a result of the attack of the intruder, he wasn't deprived of that protection merely because he was outside of the car at the time.
[00:31:31.259] [SPEAKER_00] These Castle Doctrine cases have been coming fast and furious. We'll certainly keep an eye on it in the future.
[00:31:36.021] [SPEAKER_01] That's all for today. In this episode, we discussed State v. Wilson, pertaining to a kidnapping indictment, State v. Farouk, which had to do with a speedy trial issue and Harbison error, and State v. Williams, which dealt with the scope of the Castle Doctrine. Turning States is a collaboration between the University of North Carolina School of Government and the North Carolina Conference of District Attorneys. We are coming to you from the recording studio at the School of Government in beautiful Chapel Hill. Special thanks to our producer, Paul Bonner, and to Gustav Holtz for our music. If you liked what you heard today, if you have questions, comments, concerns, if there's a topic you'd like for us to cover in a later episode, please contact us. My name is Joseph Hyde. I can be reached at jhyde at sog.unc.edu. That's j-h-y-d-e at
[00:32:20.945] [SPEAKER_00] sog.unc.edu. And I'm Jonathan Holbrook, and I can be reached at jonathan.p.holbrook at nccourts.org. That's j-o-n-a-t-h-a-n dot p Thank you, John. That would be the showing for the state. Sounds good, Joe. Thanks. Hope it helped.
[00:33:00.906] [UNKNOWN] Thank you.